THE RAJIV-LONGOWAL ACCORD A new chapter was now about to be opened in the Punjab tragedy. A chapter from recently relased book -Khalistan : A Non Movement by Jagtar Singh Journalist, Chandigarh
In a move to strengthen the hands of Longowal, the Punjab government announced partial amnesty for those detained since 1982 under charges other than sedition, murder, dacoity and arson. The announcement was made by the Governor on the death anniversary of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Amritsar on June 28. Baba Joginder Singh, however, demanded that all the detainees should be released if the government was sincere. Again, this has to be seen in the context of the behind the scene parleys between Sant Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi in which Arjun Singh played a crucial role. He was considered to be one of the architects of the Accord.Longowal too, like Balwant Singh, was convinced that the Sikhs would be in for bigger trouble in case the situation was allowed to linger on. He had revealed his mind to this writer at a meeting after his release at his native village, Gidriani, near Lehragaga in Sangrur district. A posse of police guarded his ordinary house in the village. He went to the extent of saying that he was aware of the danger to his life and was prepared to make the supreme sacrifice. His dera was at Kaimbowal village adjoining Longowal a few kilometers away in the same district.The formal negotiations followed the 4-page letter Longowal wrote to the Prime Minister on June 2 presenting the case of the Akali Dal following the ground work done by the intermediaries who mainly included Arjun Singh and former finance minister Balwant Singh. Strangely, he did not list any pre-conditions. Taking note of the offer by the Prime Minister for negotiated settlement, Longowal said in this secret letter that his party had always been committed to the unity and integrity of the country and those suspecting the Sikhs and the Akali Dal were the real enemies of the Sikhs. He clarified that the Akali Dal had never supported secessionism or the separatist forces. Projecting the Sikhs as anti-national was part of the conspiracy to disintegrate the country. Defending the Anandpur Sahib resolution, he sought state autonomy. Immediate transfer of Chandigarh and setting up of a commission to identify the Punjabi speaking areas in other states and referring the river waters dispute to the Supreme Court were the other issues. The other concerns he referred to included the enactment of all India gurdwara legislation, second language status to Punjabi in the neighbouring states, recruitment in the defence services on merit alone and holy city status for Amritsar. Longowal specified the demands of his party in this so far unpublished correspondence. Referring to the issues concerning Punjab, the Sikhs and the Akali Dal, he started with the situation arising out of Operation Bluestar. In this context, he sought an end to the state repression, release of detenus, withdrawal of cases against the army men who had deserted their barracks in protest and other government employees, compensation to the next of kin killed during the army action, punishment to the guilty of November, 1984 massacre of the Sikhs and setting up of special courts for the protection of human rights of the Sikhs and withdrawal of all black laws. He ended the letter with the suggestion that the procedure and medium to settle these issues to be finalized through personal contacts while maintaining that the party would welcome the "constructive initiative to resolve the issue".He started the letter saying, "For the last some time, the Prime Minister has repeatedly announced that the Government of India was willing to settle the issues concerning Punjab and the Sikhs within the framework of the unity and integrity of the country. The Shiromani Akali Dal which has always articulated the Sikh view point and the interests of Punjab has always been committed to the unity and integrity of the country. The party has also been of the considered view that the real threat to the unity and integrity of the country were those who had been raising doubts about the loyalty of the Sikhs to the country…. We have never supported the secessionism and terrorism. If despite this commitment of the Akali Dal the party is dubbed as anti-national, then it is very unfortunate and part of despicable conspiracy to strike at the unity and integrity of the country". Rajiv Gandhi was quick to respond and in his letter dated June 3, he appreciated "your overriding commitment to the integrity of India; your concern for communal harmony; and your opposition to violence, secession and terrorism" while taking note of the fact that "there are no preconditions in your latter". He further said, "I am asking the Governor of Punjab to get in touch with you regarding your letter and I shall follow up with him on my return from my foreign tour". Longowal, in his letter dated June 6, appreciated this gesture of the Prime Minister expressing satisfaction that "You have conceded that the campaign raising apprehensions about the commitment of the Akali Dal to the unity and integrity of the country is part of the conspiracy to disintegrate the country". He said it would not be relevant to talk of pre-conditions in the context of the issues raised by him in his earlier letter.The Governor took the initiative on June 8 and wrote to Longowal saying "I would request to kindly indicate whether it will be convenient for you to come over personally to meet me or you would like to nominate someone on your behalf to do so at the earliest possible opportunity so that further action may be initiated in the light of the letter exchanged between the Hon. Prime Minister and your goodself".
The very same day, Longowal wrote to Arjun Singh authorizing Balwant Singh for the talks. He wrote, "In the context of the correspondence exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself, I authorize Mr. Balwant Singh as my representative to contact you". He did not trust any other Akali leader for this purpose including Badal and Tohra who were senior to Balwant Singh. He had ignored these two senior leaders at this very stage itself. This was perhaps one of the reasons as to why Badal and Tohra did not accompany Longowal to Delhi to sign the accord and stayed back. And ironically, both these leaders ratified the accord when it was made a condition for the allotment of the tickets for the Assembly elections. Of course, the reasons given out by them later for not joining Longowal in Delhi were different.An unsigned and undated note purportedly scribbled by Arjun Singh on the letter head of Raj Bhavan stated: "We are in contact with the Akali Dal leadership to work out the modalities for negotiations to arrive at an amicable solution to the Punjab problem. This is an internal problem of the country and we shall solve it without any outside help. The Sikhs are as patriotic as any other Indian citizen and they occupy a place of pride in our national polity".At the time when the parleys had already started, Longowal, commenting on certain statements of the Prime Minister about negotiated settlement, said, "Such moves were like a person who after killing your child, twirls his moustache and declares that he is ready for negotiations….we don't want a sarkar (government), we want 'izzat' (honour), 'insaaf (justice) and 'dharam' (religion)". He was categoric that there could be no negotiations for a settlement unless the government took steps to improve the atmosphere in the state. However, the reality was different.
The Prime Minister sent the formal invitation to the Akali Dal chief on July 2 "to come to Delhi at your earliest convenience for a meeting with me so that we could discuss and decide the manner in which further steps are to be taken".This invitation to Longowal was discussed at a meeting of the senior leaders including Longowal, Tohra, Badal, Barnala and Balwant Singh. Tohra insisted that release of all the Sikh detainees should be the minimum precondition. He said, "We should have patience. Entering into a dialogue is the compulsion of the government, not ours. We have already gone through the worst. The government must release the Sikh army men who left their barracks and the Sikh detenus to pave way for the talks".
The issue of talks also cropped up at a meeting of senior leaders, district jathedars and ex-MPs and ex-MLAs at Anandpur Sahib on July 8. It was decided to list some pre-conditions which included abolition of all black laws and special courts, withdrawal of false cases against the Sikh youth and Akali workers, judicial inquiry into the November 1984 massacre of the Sikhs and withdrawal of warrants issued against Akal Takht Jathedar Giani Kirpal Singh for appearing in a Ludhiana court in the case relating to the attack against him. The meeting authorized Longowal to revive the Dharamyudh morcha and lead it as and when it was re-launched. It was also decided that the party leaders would visit other states to remove misgivings about the Anandpur Sahib resolution.Longowal had also approached Babbar Khalsa on the issue of negotiations with the Centre but the militant organization opposed such moves. It was senior Babbar Khalsa militant Anokh Singh, a former employee of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, who was then organizing secretary of the outfit with whom Longowal had held discussions. Anokh warned him about the consequences of any deal with the government at that juncture which was considered to be a defining moment for the Sikhs as a community which was still to come out of the trauma of Operation Bluestar and the November massacre. This was the only militant organization with which Longowal had his channels of communications.
However, Longowal accepted the formal invitation for talks in his letter to the Prime Minister on July 16. The letter was again vague about the preconditions. Longowal said in his reply that he shared the anxiety of the Prime Minister to arrive at some settlement in the interest of the country and Punjab.Another letter from Rajiv Gandhi was received a few days later in which it was stated that the release of the army deserters would be given priority at the talks. Tohra tried to impress upon Longowal that once they went for the talks without pre-conditions, the demand for the release of detainees would not be conceded. He was of the view that it was the compulsion of Rajiv Gandhi to enter into negotiations and not of the Sikhs who had already suffered the worst. He tried to impress Longowal that in case the government agreed to the release of army deserters and other detenus, the party would not mind settling for less in case of other issues. According to Tohra, Longwal initially agreed to his suggestions. Longowal shared the second letter from the Prime Minister first with Tohra.
A meeting of the senior leaders was again summoned to discuss the second letter in the SGPC sub-office at Chandigarh. Prem Singh Chandumajra, comparatively a junior leader, who was also present that day, also insisted on pre-condition of the release of the detainees. However, he got a snub following which he left the place. At the meeting, Tohra and Badal again pressed for the pre-condition. At that stage, Balwant Singh brought out the proposed draft, each and every point of which was discussed. As per the draft, Chandigarh was to be transferred to Punjab on January 26 next. Only Barnala supported Balwant Singh. Tohra expressed the apprehension of betrayal by the Centre under the cover of the accord and dubbed the proposed draft as fraud and play of words. Chandigarh was to be divided with Sector 26, industrial area and Mani Majra to be kept out. Longowal agreed to write another letter to the Prime Minister. Balwant Singh offered to get the letter typed from his office. However, Tohra got a shock in the evening when he heard over the All India Radio in the Punjabi bulletin that the meeting between Longowal and the Prime Minister was scheduled for the next morning at 9.00 AM. It was also given out that a messenger had delivered the invitation to Tohra also to reach Delhi by 8.00 AM the next day at the residence of Delhi Akali Dal leader Paramjit Singh Sarna. Tohra decided not to go and gave company to Badal in Chandigarh the day Longowal signed the accord in Delhi.Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi met for about half an hour on July 23. The spadework for the meeting had already been done by the Arjun Singh. Swaran Singh had also made his own contribution. This was the first meeting at that level after Operation Blue star. The meeting was followed by another meeting between two aides of Longowal and members of the Political Affairs Committee of the cabinet.

Longowal drove to the Parliament House along with Balwant Singh and Barnala. Arjun Singh was also present in the Prime Minister's office but withdrew after escorting Longowal to Prime Minister's office. Both Balwant Singh and Barnala waited in the ante room. The Political Affairs Committee of the Union cabinet had more than two hour meeting with the aides of Longowal. Those present at the meeting included Home Minister S. B. Chavan, Finance Minister V. P. Singh and Defence Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. Longowal wanted the government to enlarge the scope of the judicial inquiry into the November 1984 violence against the Sikhs by including violence at other places also along with Delhi, rehabilitation of the victims and punishment to the culprits and abolition of special courts and special laws. He stressed that the honour and dignity of the Sikhs must be restored. Arjun Singh earlier had several secret meetings with the top Akali leaders prior to the signing of the accord. Longowal met Arjun Singh for the first time on June 26. An aircraft kept waiting for Badal at the Chandigarh airport to airlift him to Delhi to be part of the Akali delegation. Tohra landed at the residence of Badal early in the morning and gave him the company for several hours. They stayed back.
The Punjab Accord was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal on July 24 after 36 hour round the clock discussions at various levels. The Akali Dal chief said after signing the accord that he was fully satisfied with the agreement which, for him, marked the end of the confrontation with the Centre. The accord envisaged the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab by January 26, 1986, setting up of a commission to identify Hindi speaking areas to be transferred out of Punjab and setting up of a tribunal to go into river water dispute with Haryana while protecting the usage by the two states as on July 1, 1985. The Anandpur Sahib resolution was to be referred to the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State relations. It was presumed that the accord would put an end to the violence. But then the already marginalized Akali Dal (Longowal) did not dictate the situation at that time. This was one of the reasons, besides the intentions of the Centre, for the non-implementation of the accord. It met the fate it was destined to. The accord was to be consigned to the dustbin of history. Moreover, the fight was between the militants and the Centre and the Akali Dal (Longowal) was not a party to this bloody confrontation. The accord, to be effective, should have been signed with those who were spearheading the Sikh struggle. The accord failed to take off.
In Amritsar, a small group of the United Akali Dal and the AISSF activists staged demonstration against the accord in front of the Darbar Sahib complex. The ad hoc committee of the United Akali Dal, on July 25, passed a resolution rejecting the accord saying it was a sell out. The resolution said Longowal, Barnala and Bawant Singh had no right to represent the Sikhs. The three leaders, by becoming party to the accord, had justified Operation Bluestar, the desecration of the Darbar Sahib, burning of the religious books in the Sikh reference library and the attack on other Sikh shrines. The slogan given by the Darbar Sahib based militants was: "Sikh qaum de tin gaddaar, Balwant, Barnala te Longowal". Within a few weeks, Longowal had to pay the highest cost for entering into the accord. A representative meeting of the Akali Dal (L) held at Anandpur Sahib on July 26 ratified the accord amidst criticism from Badal and Tohra. Longowal announced the withdrawal of the Dharamyudh morcha. Tohra said, "It (accord) is not an achievement but ruination". Badal commented, "We had taken a pledge at Akal Takht about our demands. As these have not been accepted, we should withdraw this pledge… we have lost our wealth, our religious places and honour". The two leaders who did not ratify the accord by raising their hands were Tohra and Badal. A total of 52 persons voted in favour of the accord and 19 against it. While commenting upon the accord years later in private talk, Tohra was of the view that Longowal was sincere towards the Panth but lacked political maturity and would not go into the depth of the issue. He was not greedy and would easily trust people. He did not use the word naïve for him.
The reaction to the accord in Haryana was on expected lines. The opposition parties decided to launch agitation. Twenty nine members of the Haryana Assembly from the Opposition, on July 27, handed over their resignations to their leaders to be submitted to the Speaker on August 9. The opposition parties included the Lok Dal, the BJP, the Janata Party, the Congress (S) and the Congress (J). Former chief minister Devi Lal gave a call for Haryana Bandh on July 31. Rajasthan also adopted aggressive attitude as the accord envisaged adjudication of the river waters though that state had been excluded from the water dispute. Rajiv Gandhi had assured that the interests of Haryana and Rajasthan would be safeguarded. The Haryana Lok Dal and the Bharatiya Janata Party described the accord as surrender to terrorism and demanded the resignation of Bhajan Lal for having failed to protect the interests of the state. It was Badal who had been first approached by Arjun Singh for initiating the dialogue. The bait was the office of the chief minister after the Assembly elections which were proposed to be managed in favour of the Akali Dal. He was assured that dummy candidates would be put up by the Congress to facilitate the exercise. However, while he declined the offer, both Barnala and Balwant Singh took the bait. Badal was against entering into any agreement without some concrete steps having been taken by the Centre to restore the confidence of the Sikhs. Earlier also, Badal had been approached by the emissary from the Centre while in jail after Operation Bluestar but he had refused to meet him. As the Centre decided to release him, he was brought to Delhi and the special aircraft carrying him was parked in one corner of the airport. He was given the signal that an emissary from the Centre was to hold discussions with him. He declined again. He was flown to Chandigarh and dropped at his residence.The hostile reception to Longowal in the Darbar Sahib complex on July 30 was an indication of the mood of the forces dictating the political discourse. Rival Akali activists clashed at the arrival of Longowal. Shots were fired in the air and swords, iron rods, lathis and brickbats were freely used. He was to preside over a meeting of his party's district jathedars. The situation provided an excuse to the security forces to intervene. The SGPC lodged a strong protest the next day with the Governor over the entry of the security forces into the shrine complex. But then after the army action, entry of the security forces had ceased to be an issue.The assassination of Congress leader Lalit Makan and his wife Geetanjali in Delhi on July 31 within days of signing the accord was an indication that it was not the anti-dote to militancy. The assassination was revenge for the massacre of the Sikhs in Delhi in November. The accord had thus already been rendered redundant within days of its signing.
Longowal met Tohra a few days later to impress him the need to start political activity and assured that all the Sikh detenus would be released within two months. Tohra suggested to him that the Assembly elections announcement should be delayed till then as it was not possible to go to the people otherwise. Longowal's response was positive. However, the elections were announced the very next day. Longowal, who was under attack for betraying the Sikhs, had himself been let down by the Centre on this issue.Longowal gunned downThe Akali Dal President convened a meeting of the party at Longowal to discuss the allotment of tickets for the Assembly elections. Both Tohra and Badal were conspicuous by their absence. He sent them a message to meet them. They conveyed that they would be present at Nadampur rest house in Sangrur district on August 20. Tohra protested that he had again kept them in the dark. Longowal extended the excuse that he did not get time to take up the issue of poll postponement with the Centre. Tohra was of the view that the notification was still to be issued and as such, the elections could be deferred. Longowal, on the suggestion of Tohra, constituted a two member committee, including Badal, to talk to Baba Joginder Singh to contest the elections on a single platform. The tickets were to be allotted by the Parliamentary Board of the Akali Dal (L).However, within few hours the very same day, Longowal, 53, was gunned down around 5.30 PM by the militants at a gurdwara in Sherpur village in Sangrur district. The doctors at the civil hospital, Sangrur, announced his death at 9.32 PM. Tohra, Badal, Barnala and Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa had reached the hospital by that time. Teams of doctors were rushed from Patiala and Chandigarh. One of his assailants was shot on the spot by the security men while his associate, Gian Singh Leel, was overpowered. Longowal had been provided security by the Punjab police apprehending threat to his life from the militants for signing the accord. He was aware of the risk involved even before the signing of the accord.A day earlier while addressing a gathering at a Hindu temple (Luxmi Mandir) at Sunam, he had said that he was prepared to make the supreme sacrifice for the unity and integrity of the country and stoutly defended the accord.The United Akali Dal, while condemning the assassination, appealed to the Akal Takht Jathedar to convene Sarbat Khalsa to seek mandate on the accord while stressing the need for unity in the Panth which was passing through a "deep crisis". The signatories to the statement included Atma Singh, Ujagar Singh Sekhwan, Parkash Singh Majitha, Ranjit Singh Brahmpura and Satwant Kaur Sandhu. The Sikh Forum headed by Amarinder Singh described the assassination as the "most shameful act" while maintaining that expeditious implementation of the accord would be the most befitting tribute to Longowal. The offices of the SGPC remained closed for two days as a mark of respect to the assassinated leader.
Amarinder Singh finally joined the Akali Dal (Longowal) on August 23. Announcing this decision, he said the Panth and Punjab were confronted with a grave situation. Well-wishers of the Panth must unite to face it. He appealed to all Akali leaders to fight for the interests of the community and Punjab under the banner of the Akali Dal as division in the community would lead to chaos and instability.Barnala took over as the acting president though the dominant view in the party was that a committee be set up to run the party affairs. However, both Amarinder Singh and Ravi Inder Singh did not favour the idea. Finally, the name of Barnala was proposed by Tohra and seconded by Ravi Inder Singh. Both Tohra and Badal were included in the Parliamentary Board which was dominated by the Barnala associates. -----------------------------------------------
TEXT OF PUNJAB ACCORD: RAJIVE LONGOWAL ACCORD SINGNED ON JULY 24 ,1985 IN NEW DELHI 1. Compensation to innocent persons killed; 1.1 Along with ex-gratia payment to those innocent killed in agitation or any action after August 1, 1982. Compensation for property damaged will also be paid. 2. Army recruitment: 2.1 All citizens of the country have the right to enroll in the army and merit will remain the criterion of selection. 3. Enquiry into November riots: 3.1 the jurisdiction of Shri Ranganath Mishra Commission enquiring into November riots of Delhi would be extended to cover disturbances at Bokaro and Kanpur also; 4. Rehabilitation of those discharged from the army: 4.1 For all those discharged efforts will be made to rehabilitate and provide gainful employment; 5. All India Gurdwara Act: 5.1 The Government of India agrees to consider the formulation of an All India Gurdwara Bill. Legislation will be brought forward for this purpose in consultation with Shiromani Akali Dal, others concerned and fulfilling all constitutional requirements; 6. Disposal of pending cases 6.1 The notification applying the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to Punjab will be withdrawn. Existing special courts will try only cases relating to the following type of offences: (a) waging war and (b) hijacking. 6.2 All other cases will be transferred to ordinary courts and enabling legislation if necessary will be brought forward in this session of Parliament. 7. Territorial claims: 7.1 The capital project of Chandigarh will go to Punjab. Some adjoining areas which were previously part of Hindi or the Punjabi regions were included in the Union territory. With the capital region going to Punjab the areas which were added to the Union territory from the Punjabi region of the erstwhile state of Punjab will be transferred to Punjab and those from Hindi region to Haryana. The entire Sukhna lake will be kept part of Chandigarh and will thus go to Punjab. 7.2 It had always been maintained by Smt. Indira Gandhi that when Chandigarh is to go to Punjab, some Hindi speaking territories in Punjab will go to Haryana. A commission will be constituted to determine the specific Hindi speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. The principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit will be the basis of such determination. The commission will be required to give its findings by 31st December, 1985 and these will be binding on both sides. The work of the commission will be limited to this aspect and will be distinct from the general boundary claims which the other commissions referred to in para 7.4 will handle. 7.3 The actual transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and areas in lieu thereof to Haryana will take place simultaneously on 26th January, 1986. 7.4 There are other claims and counter claims for readjustment of the existing Punjab- Haryana boundaries. The government will appoint another commission to consider these matters and give its findings. Such findings will be binding on the concerned states. The terms of reference will be based on a village as a unit, linguistic affinity and contiguity. 8. Centre-State relations: 8.1 Shiromani Akali Dal states that the Anandpur Sahib resolution is entirely within the framework of the Indian constitution, that it attempts to define the concept of centre-state relations in a manner which may bring out the true federal characteristics of our unitary constitution and that the purpose of the resolution is to provide greater autonomy to the states with a view to strengthening the unity and integrity of the country, since unity in diversity forms the corner stone of our national entity. 8.2 In view of the above, the Anandpur Sahib resolution in so far as it deals with Centre-State relations, stands referred to the Sarkaria Commission. 9. Sharing of river waters: 9.1 The farmers of Punjab , Haryana and Rajasthan will continue to get water not less than what they are using from the Ravi-Beas system as on 1.7.1985. waters used for consumptive purposes will also remain unaffected. Quantum of usage claimed shall be verified bye the tribunal referred to in para 9.2 below. 9.2 The claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares in their remaining waters will be reffered for adjudication to a tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court judge. The decision of the tribunal will be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties. All legal and constitutional steps required in this respect be taken expeditiously. 9.3 The construction of the SYL canal shall continue. The canal shall be completed by 15th August, 1986. 10. Representation of minorities: 10.1 Existing instructions regarding protection of interests of minorities will be recirculated to the state chief ministers. (PM will write to all chief ministers). 11. Promotion of Punjabi language: 11.1 The central government may take some steps for the promotion of the Punjabi language. This settlement brings to an end a period of confrontation and ushers in an era of amity, goodwill and cooperation which will promote and strengthen the unity and integrity of India.